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Objectives: Without urgent action, climate change will put the health of future populations
at risk. Policies to reduce these risks require support from today's populations; however,
there are few studies assessing public support for such policies. Willingness to pay (WtP), a
measure of the maximum a person is prepared to pay for a defined benefit, is widely used
to assess public support for policies. We used WtP to investigate whether there is public
support to reduce future health risks from climate change and if individual and contextual
factors affect WtP, including perceptions of the seriousness of the impacts of climate
change.
Study design: A cross-sectional British survey.
Methods: Questions about people's WtP for policies to reduce future climate change-related
deaths and their perceptions of the seriousness of climate change impacts were included
in a British survey of adults aged 16 years and over (n¼1859). We used contingent valuation,
a survey-based method for eliciting WtP for outcomes like health which do not have a
direct market value.
Results: The majority (61%) were willing to pay to reduce future increases in climate
change-related deaths in Britain. Those regarding climate change impacts as not at all
serious were less willing to pay than those regarding the impacts as extremely serious (OR
0.04, 95% CI 0.02-0.09). Income was also related to WtP; the highest-income group were
twice as likely to be willing to pay as the lowest-income group (OR 2.14, 95% CI 1.40-3.29).
Conclusions: There was public support for policies to address future health impacts of
climate change; the level of support varied with people's perceptions of the seriousness of
these impacts and their financial circumstances. Our study adds to evidence that health,
including the health of future populations, is an outcome that people value and suggests
that framing climate change around such values may help to accelerate action.k (H. Graham).
Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The Royal Society for Public Health. This is an open access article
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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The health impacts of climate change on today's populations
are becoming increasingly evident.1,2 Failure to keep global
mean temperatures within 1.5 centigrade of pre-industrial
levels will threaten the health of future populations;3,4 pro-
jections point to increases in global temperatures by 2050 that
are significantly above this threshold.5,6 In the UK context,
increasing temperatures are associated with an increased
frequency and intensity of extreme hot weather and flooding;
these climate changeerelated exposures have been high-
lighted as major risks to the future health of the UK pop-
ulation,7e10 with older people and children particularly at
risk.7,11,12 The Climate Change Act (2008) sets the framework
for climate governance in the UK and mandates action on
mitigation and adaptation.13,14 Both offer significant cobene-
fits for public health1,15,16 and are urgently needed to protect
the health of future populations.5,6 The health of future pop-
ulations turns on the actions of today's population and, in
particular, on the speed andmagnitude of the policy response
to climate change.1,6,17e19 However, policiesdand the eco-
nomic evaluations that inform themdgive greater weight to
the well-being of current populations.20e22 A time weight (a
discount rate) is appliedwhen assessing the costs and benefits
of policies, with future costs and benefits valued less highly
than current ones. Discounting is designed to take account of
the variable timescales over which costs and benefits are
distributed.23 It is also seen to be in line with public's prefer-
ence to receive benefits now and ‘to defer costs to future
generations’.20
It is increasingly recognised that standard discounting
approaches are less appropriate for policies with long-term
effects, including those with impacts on the climate sys-
tem.22 However, little is known about public preferences for
reducing climate change risks for those living in the future.
One measure used to assess people's preferences is their
willingness to pay (WtP) to helpmeet the cost of such policies.
WtP captures the value that an individual places on an
outcome (for example, reduced health risks from climate
change) in monetary terms and reflects both the strength of
their preference for the outcome and their ability and will-
ingness to give up consumption of other goods to pay for it.
We searched Web of Science up to December 2018 for WtP
studies framed around the health risks of climate change
(using the terms ‘health’, ‘climate change’ and ‘WtP’). We
found very few studies and no UK studies. For example,
studies investigated people's WtP to reduce climate
changeerelated health risks from flooding in Switzerland,24
from variations in temperature in Taiwan25 and from air
pollution in Pennsylvania;26 they indicated that communi-
cating both the public health and the climate change benefitsof interventions increased people's WtP. Using a representa-
tive British survey, we estimate people's WtP for policies to
reduce future deaths in the UK that may result from climate
change.Methods
Stated preference (SP) methods provide a survey-based
method for estimating the economic value that people atta-
ch to outcomes for which there is not a direct market val-
ue,27e29 such as protecting the health of future populations
and improving the natural environment. One widely used SP
method is contingent valuation (CV). This asks people how
much they would be willing to pay for a benefit in a hypo-
thetical scenario, for example, if they would be willing pay a
specified monetary cost (e.g. £1 a month for 10 years) to sup-
port a policy that yielded a specified benefit in X years' time.28
The use of SPmethods in such contexts is supported by official
guidance on how to conduct appraisals of public policy ini-
tiatives such as climate change policy.20 For our study, we
used deaths, the most widely used health measure and one
suitable for a general population survey.30 We derived our
measure from the UK's national assessment of future UK
deaths from increasing global temperatures.7 This estimated
an additional 7000 climate changeerelated deaths per year
from heatwaves by the 2050s, with additional, but uncertain,
deaths from other climate changeerelated exposures,
including from flooding, worsening air quality and increased
pathogens.7
Based on a representative British survey, we used CV to
estimate people's WtP to reduce future deaths that may result
from climate change. The Opinions and Lifestyle Survey (OLS)
is a cross-sectional national survey governed by the UK Gov-
ernment's Statistics Authority Office code of practice and
overseen by the National Statistician's Data Ethics Advisory
Committee.31,32 Our studywas approved by the Department of
Health Sciences Research Governance Committee at the Uni-
versity of York.
The OLS is based on a randomprobability sample of private
households in Britain, drawn from the Postcode Address File
(PAF) containing approximately 26m addresses.32 Updated
every three months, the PAF is the most complete address
database in the UK. The OLS sample is stratified by region and
sociodemographic profile. Sociodemographic stratification is
based on the proportions of households with no car; house-
holds where the household reference person has an occupa-
tion in a higher socio-economic group; and people aged >65
years. The survey runs eight months a year; a new sample is
drawn each month, and one adult per household is randomly
selected for a face-to-face computer-assisted personal
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demographic questions, together with commissioned
modules.
We commissioned a CV question in the January and
February 2016 OLS on people's WtP for policies to maintain
climate changeerelated deaths at their current level. Survey
participants were asked whether they would be willing to pay
(‘yes’/‘no’) an ongoing monthly payment of a randomly
assigned ‘bid amount’ of £1, £2, £5, £10 or £20 to hold climate
changeerelated deaths at current levels rather than see such
deaths increase (see Box 1); evidence indicates that binary
choices result in a more reliable revelation of preferences.28
The range of bid values was determined from a pilot study,
also using the OLS, where participants were asked to choose
how much they would pay per month from a choice of £0, £1,
£2, £5, £10, £20 or £50.
The question provided additional contextual information
on the number of additional annual deaths expected by 2050Box 1
Willingness-to-pay question.
Each participant was presented with a variation of the
following question, in which text in square brackets was
varied:
Climate change is expected to have a negative impact
on health and well-being, and scientists expect that
climate change will cause more deaths in the UK. Sci-
entists from the UK Committee on Climate Change pre-
dict that if we continue to use energy in the way we
currently do, there may be
 7000 more deaths per year in the UK by 2050 (over 3
times higher than current levels) and
 12,000 more deaths per year in the UK by [A] (6 times
higher than current levels).
[B] are two groups that are particularly at risk. It will
cost money to put in place environmental policies to
reduce these risks. We would like to know what you feel
would be an acceptable amount of public spending to
reduce these impacts.
Would you be willing to pay an additional [X] in your
taxes each month for the next ten years to reduce
climate-related deaths to current levels?
The varied texts were randomly assigned so that
 A quarter of respondents were presented with
A¼ ‘2080’& B¼ ‘The elderly and the very young’ (of these,
one fifth received each of the five bid amounts X: £1, £2,
£5, £10, £20)
 A quarter of respondents were presented with
A¼ ‘2080’& B¼ ‘The elderly’ (of these, one-fifth received
each of the five bid amounts X: £1, £2, £5, £10, £20)
 Half of respondents were presented with A ¼ ‘2115’ &
B ¼ ‘The elderly and the very young’ (of these, one-fifth
received each of the five bid amounts X: £1, £2, £5,
£10, £20)and one of two subsequent years (2080 and 2115) if no addi-
tional action was taken; and on the population groupsmost at
risk (the elderly and the very young). This contextual infor-
mation was provided in one of the three forms (see Box 1),
which were randomly assigned to respondents. Participants
were also asked, after the question on WtP, ‘how would you
rate the seriousness of the impacts of climate change?’
(hereafter ‘perceived seriousness of climate change’).
Response options were extremely serious, fairly serious, not
very serious or not at all serious.
In line with the OLS average, the response rate across the
months of our study was 50% (n ¼ 1859). Analyses were per-
formed using Stata, version 15. An estimate of average WtP
was obtained from the CV responses by fitting a univariate
logistic regression to the binary responses (willing or not
willing to pay) with the bid amount as the sole independent
variable. To make the results representative of the general
population, data were weighted to account of non-response
bias and the probability of each respondent being included
in the survey.32 Mean and median WtP were calculated from
the coefficient associated with the bid amount in the logistic
regression model.33,34 A sensitivity analysis was also per-
formed, in which all participants with unknownWtP (refused
to answer or stated that they did not know) were assumed to
be unwilling to pay.
A multivariate logistic regression was then used to assess
the association of WtP with other factors. Candidate inde-
pendent variables were the bid amount; the respondent's
perception of the seriousness of climate change; their gener-
ation of birth (before 1946; 1946e1965; 1966e1985; after 1985);
their individual gross income (split into five bands with
approximately equal numbers of participants in each: less
than <£7280, £7280e£12,479, £12,480e£18,719, £18,720e£28,599
and £28,600); education (degree level or above, below degree
level, none); health status (presence or absence of long-
standing limiting illness); gender; parenthood status (pres-
ence or absence of a child younger than 16 years in the
household); and the context offered in the question. Variables
were added in turn and retained if they reduced the Bayesian
information criterion (BIC) by more than 3. Multiple imputa-
tion with ten iterations using chained equations35 with an
ordered logistic model was used to handle missing data for
income band and perceived seriousness of climate change. In
addition to the candidate-independent variables listed previ-
ously, car ownership and employment status were also
included in the imputation.Results
Themajority of respondents were willing to answer questions
on their perceptions of climate change (98%) and their WtP to
reduce climate changeerelated deaths (97%); the remaining
responses were refused or answered ‘do not know’. Among
the other variables, only income had missing data (7%).
Perceived seriousness of climate change
Climate change was considered extremely or fairly serious by
86% of respondents (Table 1). Some variation was seen
Table 1 e Perceived seriousness of the impacts of climate change.
Demographic
grouping
Percent of respondents that consider the
impacts of climate change:
% considering
impacts
extremely
or fairly serious
% considering
impacts not very
or not at
all serious
Number of
participants
Extremely
serious
Fairly
serious
Not very
serious
Not at
all Serious
Do not
know/refused
All 41 45 9 3 2 86 12 1859
Gender
Male 40 42 11 5 1 82 16 815
Female 41 48 7 2 3 89 8 1044
Generation
Pre-1946 31 50 12 4 4 80 16 341
1946e1965 43 41 9 5 3 83 14 630
1966e1985 44 45 7 2 2 89 9 613
Post-1985 41 51 5 2 1 92 7 275
Income band
Under £7280 44 45 6 2 2 90 9 326
£7280e£12,479 37 44 12 3 4 81 15 368
£12,480e£18,719 38 47 9 4 2 84 14 332
£18,720e£28,599 43 47 5 3 2 91 8 330
£28600 and above 45 42 9 2 2 87 11 367
Do not know/refused 29 49 10 7 6 78 16 136
Level of education
Degree or above 52 39 5 2 1 92 7 464
Below degree 37 47 9 3 3 84 13 1004
None 35 48 10 4 3 83 14 391
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pre-1946 generation considered climate change to be
extremely or fairly serious, compared to 92% of the post-1985
generation.
WtP to reduce climate changeerelated deaths
Overall, 61% of peoplewerewilling to pay the amount asked to
reduce future climate change deaths (Table 2). As the bid value
increased, the probability that people were willing to pay this
amount declined. A large majority (78%) were willing to pay if
asked for £1 a month, compared with 46% of those asked for
£20. The mean amount people were willing to pay was £19.17
(95% confidence interval [CI] £15$64 - £22$70, Table 3).
The final multivariate model included the bid amount,
perceived seriousness of climate change, birth generation,
income band and level of education. Health status, parent-
hood status and context offered in the question (timescales
for increased deaths and the elderly/very young as high-risk
groups) did not improve model fit as measured by the BIC
(nor did they have a statistically significant association with
WtP) and were excluded. Income was associated with WtP to
reduce climate change deaths (Table 4); compared to people inTable 2 eWillingness to pay to reduce climate changeerelated
Amount
asked, £
Percent willing
to pay
Percent
willing to
1 78 20
2 70 27
5 60 38
10 51 45
20 46 51
All amounts 61 36the lowest income band, people in the highest income band
were more than twice as likely to be willing to pay (odds ratio
[OR] 2$14, 95% CI 1$40e3.29). Perceptions of climate change
were also associated with WtP, with respondents who
considered it not at all serious being far less likely to pay than
those who thought it was extremely serious (OR 0$04, 95% CI
0.02e0.09).
The findings were robust to sensitivity analyses assuming
non-response to the WtP question indicated unwillingness to
pay (Table 4) and also to modelled scenarios in which non-
response to the income question was assumed to be
missing not at random (Appendix). Multiple imputation
changed associations significantly only in relation to gener-
ation of birth; without multiple imputation, post-1965 gen-
erations were more likely to be WtP than the 1946e1965
generation. This may reflect some bias introduced in the non-
imputed model by the missing data. The lack of an associa-
tion between WtP and birth generation may be due to
mediation through perceptions of the seriousness of climate
change and income, both included in the models. Uncertainty
around perceptions of the future impacts of climate change
has been identified as needing further investigation in WtP
studies.24deaths.
not
pay
Percent do not
know/refused
Number of
participants
2 344
3 381
2 407
4 368
3 359
3 1859
Table 3 e Mean and median willingness to pay per person (results from univariate logistic regression).
Amount willing to pay Main model, data as received with
missing responses to WtP question
Sensitivity analysis, all missing
assumed to be unwilling to pay
Mean 19$17 (95% CI £15$64 e £22$70) 18$61 (95% CI £15$16 e £22$06)
Median 14$16 (95% CI £11$84 e £16$47) 13$13 (95% CI £10$96 e £15$29)
CI, confidence interval.
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The majority of study participants considered climate change
to be a serious problem, a finding consistent with evidence
that most adults in the UK are worried about climate
change.36e38 Perceptions of the severity of climate change
may be a result of the increase in extreme weather and
flooding in the UK, and a consequent heightened sensitivity to
the adverse impacts of climate change.39
The majority (over 60%) were willing to pay to reduce the
risk of future climate changeerelated deaths. Altruistic mo-
tives may partly determine WtP, including the value that
people place on protecting the natural environment and
future populations.26,36,40 Our CV question used additional
deaths by 2050 as its baseline scenario and included future
timescales ranging from 2080 to 2115; the majority of study
participants were also alerted to the very young being at
particular risk. None of these contextual factors were signifi-
cant predictors of WtP, suggesting that there was no signifi-
cant additional discounting for avoidance of deaths further
into the future. The presence of children in the household was
also not a significant predictor of WtP, suggesting that WtPTable 4 e Contingent valuation model and sensitivity analysis
(results from multivariate logistic regression).
Main model, data as received w
missing responses to WtP questi
Odds ratio 95% CI
Bid amount (per £10) 0$47 0$40-0$56
Perceived seriousness of effects of climate change
Extremely serious 1
Fairly serious 0$35 0$27-0$46
Not very serious 0$08 0$05-0$13
Not at all serious 0$04 0$02-0$09
Generation
Pre-1946 1$08 0$76-1$53
1946e1965 1
1966e1985 1$32 0$98-1$80
Post-1985 1$38 0$93-2$06
Income band
Under £7280 1
£7280-£12,479 1$15 0$78-1$68
£12,480-£18,719 1$72 1$14-2$59
£18,720-£28,599 1$24 0$83-1$85
£28,600 and above 2$14 1$40-3$29
Level of education
Degree or above 1$37 1$00-1$88
Below degree 1
None 0$80 0$58-1$12
CI, confidence interval.was not tied specifically to concern about the futurewelfare of
one's children.
WtP was significantly associated with perceptions of
climate change. Those who thought climate change to be a
more serious problem were more willing to pay for policies to
reduce to address it, a finding consistent with other WtP
studies.18,24 The connection between perceptions of climate
change and WtP has been attributed to a sense of re-
sponsibility for the environment and future generations as
well as a desire to reduce one's own exposure to climate
change risks.24,26,36
People were less willing to support policies to address
climate changeerelated risks to health as the cost to them
increased. There is evidence that the public support action on
climate change at the national and international levels but
oppose tax policies that would affect them directly.41 WtP was
lower for those in the lowest income band compared to the
highest, a pattern found in most,24,25,36 but not all,26 studies.
Studies of the relationship between household income and
stated WtP typically reveal rather low elasticities (less than
unity).42 Lower WtP among those on lower incomes may not
reflect lower concern, but simply lower ability to pay. Meeting
the costs of climate change through progressive systems ofof likelihood of being willing to reduce heat-related deaths
ith
on
Sensitivity analysis, all missing
assumed to be unwilling to pay
P-value Odds ratio 95% CI P-value
<0$01 0$49 0$41-0$58 <0$01
1
<0$01 0$36 0$28-0$48 <0$01
<0$01 0$09 0$05-0$14 <0$01
<0$01 0$05 0$02-0$11 <0$01
0$66 1$09 0$78-1$53 0$61
1
0$07 1$32 0$98-1$78 0$07
0$11 1$38 0$94-2$02 0$10
1
0$48 1$20 0$83-1$73 0$33
0$01 1$65 1$11-2$45 0$01
0$29 1$37 0$92-2$02 0$12
<0$01 2$18 1$44-3$32 <0$01
0$05 1$33 0$98-1$81 0$07
1
0$20 0$79 0$57-1$08 0$14
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to funding these policies.
Some limitations of the study should be noted. Firstly,
people's perceptions of climate change and therefore their
WtP to reduce its health impacts may be related to factors
beyond the scope of our study, including an individual's
experience of extreme weather events39 and concerns about
nonehealth-related impacts of climate change such as dam-
age to property and infrastructure.43,44 Context is important in
encouraging concern and WtP for policies to address climate
change.45,46 However, in our study, variations in the contexts
presented were not associated with a significant change in
WtP. WtP was not affected by whether the very young were
said to be at particular risk in addition to the elderly or by the
timeframes and severity of the projected impacts. This may
reflect a low discount rate among respondents, such that
avoided deaths in 2050 were not viewed as significantly more
desirable than avoided deaths in 2115. Across such long time
periods, intragenerational time preferences (an individual's
preference for the timing of benefits across generations) may
be a factor.18,47 The low discount rate may also reflect a lack of
information on how the risk reduction would be achieved in
practice. An individual's WtP may be policy sensitive, influ-
enced, for example, by perceptions of and preferences for
climate change mitigation and adaptation,48 as well as by
views on the effectiveness and fairness of such policies.49
Including such potential influences on WtP was not possible
using our chosen study design (questions inserted into a
general survey) but would merit further investigation. We
would also seek to explore non-WtP in greater depth. Of those
asked to pay £1 per month, one in five were unwilling, a pro-
portion rising to four in five among those who considered the
effects of climate change to be not at all serious. Finally, our
cross-sectional study predates the recent increased public
debate about climate change action; given increasing public
concern about climate change,50 a follow-up study may find a
larger majority of adults willing to pay to reduce its future
health impacts.
Secondly, SP methods may elicit responses that are not in
line with real choice behaviour. In particular, WtP is estimated
from questions based on hypothetical scenarios; study par-
ticipants may therefore not regard their responses as conse-
quential (as having real-world consequences). Our question
on the perceived seriousness of climate change provided an
indication of whether the individual believed in and cared
about the scenario; these affective attributes have been found
to be associated with respondents regarding the scenario as
one likely to be implemented.51 Nonetheless, a study where
participants believed they would be required to pay if the
proposed policy secured popular supportdfor example, a
study linked to a public consultation on policy optionsdwould
be an important next stage in establishing people's WtP to
reduce the future health risks of climate change because we
know from other work that consequentiality is an important
aspect of demand revelation in SP methods.51
SP methods are the only ones available for estimating
economic values for which there is not a market value or
other data based on people's behaviour28 (for example, a
policy experiment enabling comparisons to be made be-
tween exposed and non-exposed populations). We followedstandard SP guidelines for survey design, including the
identification of a representative sample of the potentially
affected population, a single binary-choice question (yes/no)
that included a baseline ‘status quo’ condition (the current
number of deaths), designation of who pays (‘you’), payment
amounts and frequency, a change mechanism (a policy
intervention) and a defined benefit (reduced climate change-
related deaths at specific points in time) that, because it was
based on official estimates, would be likely to be deemed
credible by survey participants. The question was also pilo-
ted in an earlier ONS survey to ensure it was understood by
the study participants.
Thirdly, our study explored associations between WtP and
income, generation and education. All three factors were
included in our final model, and model fit supported their
inclusion. While it is possible that there are interactions be-
tween the factors, sample sizes were insufficient to fully
explore this. However, such possible interactions do not
impact on the main aim of our study: to assess population-
level WtP for a defined future public health benefit.
Our study had a number of further strengths. As well as
being based on a representative survey of adults in Britain
using individual home-based interviews, it collected a range
of sociodemographic data, including educational attainment,
income and parental status, enabling analysis of their asso-
ciation with WtP. There were few missing data for most var-
iables used in themodels. As missing data in variables used in
the multivariate model may bias estimation, mean and me-
dian WtP were estimated from the univariate model; using
data imputation, mean and median WtP were also estimated
from the multivariate model and the 95% CIs of these esti-
mates included the point estimates from the univariatemodel
provided in Table 3. The sensitivity analyses, which treated all
missing data on WtP as refusal to pay, set a lower bound on
the WtP estimates that were not significantly different to
those from the main model.
Across a range of scenarios, respondents expressed a WtP
to reduce future health impacts of climate change, suggesting
that health, including the health of future populations, is an
outcome that people value.1,18,24,40 Such a health framing is
supported by evidence of the adverse health impacts of
climate change and the opportunities for health co-benefits of
mitigation and adaptation, particularly for future pop-
ulations,1,15,16 However, although the Paris Agreement to
strengthen the global response to climate change recognised
the right to health,52 health remains marginal to climate
change policies and public debate.1,53 In this context, public
support for climate change policies that yield health benefits
underlines the important role to be played by the public health
community in accelerating national and global action on
climate change.1,54Author statements
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